{"id":232,"date":"2010-11-23T13:27:46","date_gmt":"2010-11-23T21:27:46","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.danshapiro.com\/blog\/?p=232"},"modified":"2010-11-23T22:56:32","modified_gmt":"2010-11-24T06:56:32","slug":"how-much-are-startup-options-worth","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.danshapiro.com\/blog\/2010\/11\/how-much-are-startup-options-worth\/","title":{"rendered":"How much are startup options worth?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Startup pay kind of sucks.<\/p>\n<p>This is not a well-kept secret.\u00a0 A great startup with a dozen or so people will typically pay its employees about a third less than a big company.\u00a0 Some will argue that that&#8217;s because of the value of the equity that startups give you.\u00a0 I argue that that&#8217;s the price of doing something that&#8217;s more fun but of unproven economic value.<\/p>\n<p>But regardless of why you&#8217;re doing it, there&#8217;s no question that startups ply you with ownership in the company, typically in the form of stock options.\u00a0 They will argue that there&#8217;s tremendous value in those shares, more than you&#8217;ll get from a big company, but they tend to get all nervous-looking when you ask them how *much* value.\u00a0 Now there&#8217;s no doubt that 1000 options on stock in a startup with 1mm shares outstanding (0.1%) has a lot more upside than 1000 options on stock in google (0.000003%).\u00a0 This of course raises the simple question: what are they worth?<\/p>\n<p>I&#8217;m going to give you a few tools you can use to take a swag at that value.\u00a0 More importantly, I&#8217;m going to give you a checklist of key questions to pummel your potential new employers with that will simultaneously put you in a position of much greater knowledge, and making them think you&#8217;re a badass negotiator.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=k7zvffHu_wo\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignright lazyload\" style=\"--smush-placeholder-width: 320px; --smush-placeholder-aspect-ratio: 320\/222;margin: 20px; border: 1px solid black;\" data-src=\"http:\/\/i138.photobucket.com\/albums\/q257\/candlexlight\/bride.jpg\" alt=\"&quot;I am not left handed&quot;\" width=\"320\" height=\"222\" src=\"data:image\/svg+xml;base64,PHN2ZyB3aWR0aD0iMSIgaGVpZ2h0PSIxIiB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvMjAwMC9zdmciPjwvc3ZnPg==\" \/><\/a>Note that many people would prefer you not know this stuff.\u00a0 At most startups, the equity&#8217;s worth a lot less than you might imagine (as you&#8217;ll see below).\u00a0 One of my favorite bloggers, Mark Suster, argues that you should just <a href=\"http:\/\/www.bothsidesofthetable.com\/2010\/09\/06\/how-to-discuss-stock-options-with-your-team\/\">assume the equity is valueless and be pleasantly surprised if you find otherwise<\/a>.\u00a0 This is one of the reasons I admire Mark &#8211; he&#8217;s so good at closing candidates that before he does it, he takes on voluntary challenges.\u00a0 It&#8217;s like he&#8217;s working on an xbox achievement.<\/p>\n<p>Me? I want my potential new hires to know exactly what they&#8217;re getting, erring neither high nor low.\u00a0 I don&#8217;t want them misled with a number that&#8217;s too big, or there&#8217;s hell to pay when they realize they&#8217;ve been had.\u00a0 And I don&#8217;t want to sandbag, because closing a hire is hard enough without telling people to ignore the equity upside.\u00a0 So that&#8217;s what I&#8217;m here to tell you: how to know if you&#8217;re getting a good deal from a startup.\u00a0 And my secret ulterior motive is this: I usually give my employees a great deal on their equity.\u00a0 That means that if they&#8217;re informed consumers, my companies&#8217; offers look awesome compared to anything else they&#8217;re seeing.<\/p>\n<p>Let&#8217;s start with the basics, which are completely misleading.\u00a0 Then I&#8217;ll get to the important stuff.<\/p>\n<p>The value of a whack of equity is this:<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone\" src=\"http:\/\/latex.codecogs.com\/gif.latex?ValueOfCompany%20*%20\\frac{SharesYouGet}{FullyDilutedShares}\" alt=\"value of company * (shares you get \/ fully diluted shares)\" width=\"333\" height=\"42\" \/><\/p>\n<p>Quite simply, it&#8217;s your percent ownership times the company&#8217;s value.\u00a0 Seems simple enough, but it&#8217;s totally wrong.\u00a0 There&#8217;s a little reason why and a big reason.\u00a0 The little reason is that the above equation describes the value of <em>shares<\/em>.\u00a0 You&#8217;re probably receiving <em>options<\/em>.\u00a0 An option is worth less than a share.\u00a0 How much less is <a href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Black%E2%80%93Scholes\">excruciatingly difficult to model accurately<\/a>.\u00a0 It&#8217;s about the same before your first financing round, but it can be a meaningful difference if your company has taken on a few subsequent rounds of capital.<\/p>\n<p>The big reason is something investors don&#8217;t like to talk about, but here it is: <strong>the existence of preferred, &#8220;investor&#8221; shares significantly devalues regular, common shares<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<p>This isn&#8217;t some sort of rant: it&#8217;s basic economics.\u00a0 You see, investors typically take rights when they invest that put them &#8220;in front&#8221; of regular investors.\u00a0 If they invest a million bucks and the company sells for a million bucks, they get their money back and everyone else gets nothing.\u00a0 It&#8217;s called a preference, and <a href=\"http:\/\/www.feld.com\/wp\/archives\/2005\/01\/term-sheet-liquidation-preference.html\">Brad has explained it much better than I can<\/a>.\u00a0 It has a colossal impact on the expected returns.\u00a0 They also often have something called participation, meaning that after they get their money back, they continue to get returns as if they hadn&#8217;t.\u00a0 And then they have a set of terms called &#8220;protective provisions&#8221; which (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.feld.com\/wp\/archives\/2005\/01\/term-sheet-protective-provisions.html\">more Bradness<\/a>) explicitly allow them to block actions that are in the best interest of the company&#8217;s shareholders, as a whole, and supported by a majority of shareholders.<\/p>\n<p>Back <a href=\"http:\/\/www.xtranormal.com\/watch\/7471325\/\">when the IRS allowed such things<\/a>, the rule of thumb was that common stock was worth <em>one tenth<\/em> as much as preferred stock.\u00a0 And the &#8220;value of company&#8221; number, above, is a preferred stock number.\u00a0 Yikes.<\/p>\n<p>So that&#8217;s the bad news: options on common shares in a venture funded company have a pretty crappy book value.<\/p>\n<p>If you thought the company was worth what the IRS does, you probably would just take Mark&#8217;s advice and ignore the equity.\u00a0 But there&#8217;s other ways to look at it.<\/p>\n<p>Another, quite reasonable way to consider the value of the options (or at least their value to you), is to look at what you predict they&#8217;ll be worth.\u00a0 Most startups that try to sell the value of your options do this in an optimistic (some might say &#8220;false&#8221;) way.\u00a0 I&#8217;ve heard the phrase &#8220;Our company just wouldn&#8217;t accept an offer of less than $500,000,000&#8221; uttered by recruiters.\u00a0 But there&#8217;s a right way as well as a wrong way.<\/p>\n<p>The basic math for this one is:<\/p>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone\" src=\"http:\/\/latex.codecogs.com\/gif.latex?SalePrice*PercentOwnership\" alt=\"SalePrice * PercentOwnership\" width=\"249\" height=\"17\" \/><\/p>\n<p>that means you take your shares, divide by total shares, and multiply by what you think it&#8217;ll sell for.\u00a0 Of course, nothing&#8217;s that simple.\u00a0 You have to:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Account for the possibility that the company may fail<\/li>\n<li>Consider dilution from subsequent financing rounds<\/li>\n<li>Subtract any preference<\/li>\n<li>Account for any participation<\/li>\n<li>Subtract bonus\/retention\/carveout packages<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>and a bunch of other tricks that investors (and management) can use to manipulate the return curve.\u00a0 This becomes unbelievably complicated, since key factors are things like how good a negotiator your CEO is.\u00a0 To try and capture all of this, I banged out a set of heuristics (definition: &#8220;statements people will argue about&#8221;) that you can use to make a crude estimate.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Do you believe in the company?\u00a0 Really, really believe it&#8217;s going to be awesome?\u00a0 Feel in your guts that it&#8217;s going to be something amazing?\u00a0 90% of new companies fail, so if you don&#8217;t, then you should assume your stock is worthless, and stop here.\u00a0 Also, you should go work elsewhere, because life&#8217;s too short.<\/li>\n<li>Ask the company: &#8220;What is your expected exit range, and what comparables did you use to get there?&#8221;\u00a0 (in English: how much will you sell for, and who do you use as a basis for comparison).\u00a0 If you agree that this company looks like the comparables, then take the low number and divide it by 2. If they say it&#8217;s going to IPO, divide by 10 instead. This is X.<\/li>\n<li>Ask how many rounds have been raised, and how much more they expect to raise before they exit.\u00a0 Add them together, then double them, to get Y.<\/li>\n<li>Ask if there&#8217;s a preference, and if so, what multiple.\u00a0 Ask if there&#8217;s participation, and if so, is it capped.<\/li>\n<li>Cube the preference (as in, 2 x 2 x 2).\u00a0 That&#8217;s Z.<\/li>\n<li>If there&#8217;s a capped participation, add 1 to Z.\u00a0 If it&#8217;s uncapped, add 2.<\/li>\n<li>Ask who&#8217;s on the board.\u00a0 If a majority of board members are employees\/founders, do nothing.\u00a0 If it&#8217;s a 50\/50 balance between founders and investors, add 1 to Z.\u00a0 If it&#8217;s tilted towards the investors, add 2 to Z.<\/li>\n<li>Now for the grand finale:<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone\" src=\"http:\/\/latex.codecogs.com\/gif.latex?X-(Y*Z)\" alt=\"X-(Y*Z)\" width=\"96\" height=\"19\" \/><\/p>\n<p>And that&#8217;s what they&#8217;re worth.\u00a0 Here&#8217;s an example:<\/p>\n<p>You&#8217;re being offered 0.1% of a great company that thinks they&#8217;ll exit for $250-500mm.\u00a0 They&#8217;ve raised $5mm and expect to raise $10mm more.\u00a0 Terms are 1x preference, capped participation. The board is evenly split between founders and investors.<\/p>\n<p>X: 250\/2=<strong>125<br \/>\n<\/strong>Y: 15*2=<strong>30<\/strong><br \/>\nZ: 1^3+1+1=<strong>3<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>125-(30*3) = $35mm.<\/p>\n<p>You should consider your shares to be worth 0.1% * $35mm = $35k.<\/p>\n<p>I love startups.\u00a0 I love it when people get rich from startups.\u00a0 I want you to join a startup, and I want it to shower you with riches beyond your wildest dreams.\u00a0 I want you to blow all this math out of the water.\u00a0 It&#8217;s all guesstimates anyway&#8230; but it&#8217;s better than fencing left handed.<\/p>\n<p><em>Special thanks to <a href=\"http:\/\/blog.nosnivelling.com\/\" target=\"_blank\">Dave Schappell<\/a> of <a href=\"http:\/\/www.teachstreet.com\/\" target=\"_blank\">Teachstreet<\/a>, <a href=\"http:\/\/randfishkin.com\/blog\" target=\"_blank\">Rand Fishkin<\/a> of <a href=\"http:\/\/www.seomoz.org\/\" target=\"_blank\">SEOMoz<\/a>, and <a href=\"http:\/\/www.tonywright.com\/\" target=\"_blank\">Tony Wright<\/a> for proofreading and edits.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Startups ply you with ownership in the company, typically in the form of stock options.  They will argue that there&#8217;s tremendous value in those shares, more than you&#8217;ll get from a big company, but they tend to get all nervous-looking when you ask them how *much* value.  So what are they worth?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-232","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-startups"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.danshapiro.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/232","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.danshapiro.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.danshapiro.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.danshapiro.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.danshapiro.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=232"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.danshapiro.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/232\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":234,"href":"https:\/\/www.danshapiro.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/232\/revisions\/234"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.danshapiro.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=232"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.danshapiro.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=232"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.danshapiro.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=232"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}